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This paper focuses on the organization of business 
interests and on the interaction between them and regional 
governments in the field of industrial policies. 
 While the structures and activities of regional 
governments have been fairly extensively researched, the 
organization of business interests in Italy is still a largely 
unexplored terrain.  We have only scant information about the 
characteristics, internal life and modus operandi of business 
interest associations.  Moreover, little is known on the 
interaction between such associations representing business 
interests and regional governments, on the mutual influence 
these two actors exert upon each other. Given the present 
state of empirical research, therefore, the paper can only 
have a tentative and exploratory character (1). 
 I shall start by describing some features of the 
organization of business interests in Italy, which bear 
directly upon the problem of industrial policy-making at the 
regional level. 
 
The Organization of Business Interests 
 
 In Italy business interests are organized and represented 
by eight nation-wide associations (2).  Two represent private 
industry (CGII, CPMI), three artisan firms (CASA, CGIA, CNA), 
and the remaining three cooperatives (AGCI, CCI, LNC).  In 
terms of organizational structure they fall into two broad 
categories: four are second-order confederations, made up of 
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autonomous territorial and sectoral affiliate associations; 
four, on the contrary, are first-order, membership 
associations, internally articulated in territory- and 
product-defined subunits (3). 
 The presence of three business interest associations in 
the artisan and cooperative sectors can be explained largely 
in political terms. In fact, similarly to agriculture and 
trade, the pattern of business interest associability in these 
two sectors is heavily influenced by political factors.  This 
state of affairs reflects a frequently-noted characteristic of 
Italian society: a lack of autonomous associations organizing 
and representing societal interests (Pizzorno, 1980: 37).  
With the partial exception of bourgeois (especially 
industrial) interests, since the end of the 19th century 
interest groups have always been sponsored by political 
parties and have developed under their protective umbrella.  
Interest groups have relied upon the resources - organization, 
participation, legitimacy - provided in large measures by 
parties: these resources were vital for the groups' emergence 
and consolidation.  As a consequence, interest groups became 
strongly identified with and dependent upon the political 
subculture (mainly the Catholic or the Socialist) that had 
generated them in the first place. 
 In the period following the Second World War, political 
parties - especially Christian Democracy and the Communist 
Party -played a very influential role in the complex process 
which, after the abolition of the fascist corporatist system, 
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led to a new configuration of interest articulation with the 
establishment of democratic representative organizations.  
This meant that not only inter-organizational competition was 
influenced by political factors, but that the interest groups 
themselves served as instruments of inter-party competition. 
 As far as the artisan sector is concerned, the two 
largest and most influential associations (CGIA and CNA, in 
this order) were established in the immediate post-war period 
as competitive organizations under the sponsorship of, 
respectively, Christian Democracy and the left parties, with a 
view to increasing party penetration into this large section 
of the independent middle classes and attracting its political 
support (4).  The third association, CASA, was later set up as 
an interest organization linked to and sponsored by the 
Republican and Social democratic parties. 
 CGIA and CASA are second-order confederations, made up 
of, respectively, 107 and 54 local membership associations.  
CNA, on the contrary, is a first-order association, along a 
model of more centralized organizational control over the 
periphery.  For the territorial articulation of the interests 
it represents, CNA has established a large number (97) of 
local subunits at the provincial level. 
 As to the cooperatives, the three associations are fully 
integrated in the respective political subcultures, according 
to a pattern similar to that of artisan associations (5).  The 
three associations representing cooperatives are all first-
order organizations, i.e. firms join directly the national 
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association.  Their organizational structure is fundamentally 
similar and is based upon an integrated network of horizontal 
(territory-defined) and vertical  (product-defined) subunits.  
These subunits are an internal articulation of the national 
association and not autonomous organizations in their own 
right (with a separate budget, constitution, staff, etc.).  
The three associations’ organizational model, therefore, is 
identical to that of mass political parties and large trade 
unions and responds to the functional imperative of 
hierarchical control (6).  To some extent, this is a legacy of 
the post-war period, when between parties and associations 
there existed strong political and organizational links: 
especially in the case of PCI and DC, the associations were 
somehow thought of as "transmission belts” of the parties' 
policies and strategies.  This situation has been evolving in 
the past twenty years, as a result of considerable changes in 
the political climate and in the economic environment.  The 
links between parties and interest associations have loosened, 
and there has been an increasing emphasis on the 
representation of the business interests of their members and 
on the provision of services to them. 
 The other two business associations (CGII and CPMI, 
usually known as Confindustria and Confapi) have different 
origins and different structures.  Confindustria, the oldest 
and most important industrial national association in Italy, 
is a second-order confederation representing a large number of 
territorial and sectoral affiliate associations. 
 6 
Chronologically, the sectoral, industry-specific, associations 
have been established first, beginning from the last quarter 
of the 19th century, mainly in the textile and engineering 
sectors (Angelini, 1981).  But at the beginning of the 20th 
century territorial associations started to be established, 
grouping firms operating in the same area irrespective of 
sectoral differentiation.  These local business associations 
were mainly employers' organizations and were intended as a 
counterpart to the local Chambers of Labour, in order to 
defend employers' interests and coordinate their action toward 
labour.  The small size of most firms and the great 
territorial differences, in terms of industrial structure and 
socio-economic development, among Italy's various areas, 
provided a powerful incentive to the diffusion and 
consolidation of these local business associations (Berrini, 
1983). 
 Confapi is a confederation of territorial associations, 
mainly located in the northern and central areas of the 
country.  It was established in the immediate post-war period 
as a representative of small- and medium-sized firms in direct 
competition with Confindustria. 
 For the purposes of this paper, it is important to 
highlight one specific feature of the system of business 
interests representation in Italy, which emerges clearly from 
what has been said in the preceding paragraphs: the marked 
prevalence of the territorial articulation of interests is in 
fact centred upon a ramified and extensive network of local 
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associations.  This can be seen in Table 1.  The backbone, the 
basic units, of the system of business interests 
representation is the territorial organizations (7).  The 
number of territorial organizations is far larger than the 
number of sectoral, industry- specific, organizations.  What 
is more important, as far as the latter are concerned, only 
the affiliates to Confindustria enjoy the status and the 
resources of autonomous associations.  The others are all 
internal articulations (subunits) of the central 
organizations, with only limited autonomy and influence on the 
decision-making process. 
 The role of territorial associations has become 
increasingly important since, in addition to their established 
employers’ functions; they have started to provide for their 
members a growing range of services (legal, administrative, 
financial, commercial, etc.) vital for the management of the 
firms (8).  As a consequence, a division of labour has become 
established between territorial associations providing 
selective goods (assistance in labour matters and services) 
for members, and the national or peak associations providing 
public goods (mainly political representation) for business as 
a whole.  Of course, this is a simplification and a 
generalization of a much more complex situation.  Above all, 
territorial associations, in their dealings with local 
institutions and parties, do represent business interests at 
the political level.  The above statement, nonetheless, 
emphasizes a crucial aspect of the organization of business 
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interests.  The division of labour between centre and 
periphery means that at the local level inter-organizational 
competition is largely based upon the supply of different, 
more attractive or cheaper selective goods.  This is 
particularly true for small-sized or artisan firms which find 
it more convenient to rely on associations for those services, 
necessary to their activity, they are not able, or willing, to 
generate internally. 
 The reliance on local associations as service structures 
has been increasing in the 1970s, as bureaucratic and 
administrative requirements have become more complex, the need 
for specialized information and assistance has grown, and new 
challenges (technological change, marketing problems, 
financial stringencies, etc.) have made life for small-sized 
firms more difficult (9).  This has resulted in an 
instrumental orientation toward business associations, has 
lessened the role of identity or solidarity incentives, and 
has loosened the subcultural character of participation in 
associative action. 
 
The Impact of Regions on the Organization of Business 
Interests 
 
 In 1970 the first Councils of the fifteen "ordinary" 
regions (in addition to those of the five "special" regions 
already established) were elected, culminating more than two 
decades of intense political and intellectual battles 
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(Gourevitch, 1978; Leonardi et alii, 1981).  Arguably, the 
creation of the ordinary regions was one of the most important 
developments in Italian politics and government in the 
republican period. 
 What was the impact of the establishment of regional 
governments on the organization and the representation of 
business interests? 
 First, and most obviously, the establishment of elected 
governments at the regional level induced a process of 
regionalization of business associations, in order to be able 
to deal adequately with the new institutions.  An intermediate 
level was created between the national and the local 
associations, centre and periphery, the two traditional poles 
of business interest organization.  The creation of regional 
structures has been formally accomplished almost everywhere by 
all associations, with the partial exception of Confapi (see 
Table 1).  However, the diffusion of these intermediate 
organizations should not be overemphasized.  In the first 
place, a varying but significant number of regional 
associations exist only on paper; in practice they have never 
started functioning.  In the second place, even where they do 
function, these associations in general tend to be rather weak 
organizations, poorly institutionalized and with limited 
resources.  In the third place, they are to a large extent 
dependent upon either the provincial associations they 
federate or the national organizations of which they are an 
internal articulation.  This dependence is first of all 
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financial.  No regional organization has an autonomous source 
of revenue:  with the exception of Confindustria, all regional 
associations are financed directly by the centre.  
Furthermore, the centre is also the source of their legitimacy 
as political representatives of the region's firms, in the 
face of the open hostility of the provincial associations that 
are rather unhappy in seeing their prerogatives eroded by the 
newcomers. 
 Limited resources and autonomy, poor institutionalization, 
ill-defined organizational status seem to be characteristics 
common to a large part of regional business associations, 
although there are differences among the various associations 
and, within the same association, among the various regions 
(10).  In these respect, the situation of business interests at 
the regional level contrasts markedly with that of other 
interest groups, notably trade unions.  The latter in fact 
appear to have quite resolutely taken the road of the 
regionalization of their organization and to have transferred 
to regional structures considerable resources and functions.  
It remains yet to be seen if and how the strengthening of the 
regional organizations within trade unions, and other interest 
groups as well, will affect the organization of business 
interests in any significant degree. 
 This is the general picture.  It is, however, necessary 
to qualify the above statements by taking account of the 
different internal structure of the various business 
associations.  We have seen that the three associations 
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representing cooperatives and one of the associations 
representing artisan firms (CNA) are centralized 
organizations.  The establishment of regional "federations" 
was for them an internal organizational change, which did not 
have to overcome the resistance of autonomous local 
affiliates.  This enabled them to accomplish the 
regionalization of their structures in an easier, faster and 
more thorough way. 
 The situation of the two associations representing 
industrial firms (Confindustria and Confapi), and to a lesser 
extent of the other two artisan associations, is remarkably 
different. They are truly second-order confederations, where 
territorial associations dominate the internal decision-making 
process (11).  The establishment of new regional organizations 
as real representatives of business interests at the regional 
level meant inevitably a loss of prerogatives for the 
provincial associations.  Provincial associations feared the 
creation of regional federations as an attempt by the 
confederation to check their autonomy and loosen their hold 
upon the central organization.  Given the distribution of power 
within the two confederations, the local associations were 
likely to resist successfully such unfavourable developments.  
As a result, the regional federations, grouping provincial 
associations, have been formally established but they have not 
been granted any autonomous resources nor have their tasks been 
set out in any clear way. Confindustria regional federations 
are dominated by provincial associations, that finance and, to 
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a large extent, staff them. Confapi regional federations, on 
the other hand, lead a rather precarious existence, thanks 
mainly to the support they get from the centre. 
  Other factors influenced the process of regionalization 
of business interests organizations.  Let us take, for 
example, the artisan sector.  The regions were delegated the 
powers concerning the sector which were formerly held by the 
Ministry of Industry.  Through their policies and 
prerogatives, regions are therefore in a position to affect 
directly and substantively this important section of the 
regional economic system (see Falcon, 1979).  Political 
representation at the regional level thus became a necessity 
for artisan interest associations.  To this it must be added 
that in Italy institutionalized participation by interest 
organizations in the provincial and regional artisan 
committees are provided by law.  Organized artisan interests 
hold a majority within these committees, which are entrusted 
with important policy-making functions.  Again, this provided 
an extremely powerful incentive to set up regional 
organizations for the participation into these public bodies. 
 The situation of industry is very different.  The regions 
have only limited powers in the industrial field and there is 
no form of institutionalized participation into public policy-
making.  De facto, regions are not crucial institutions for 
industry.  Furthermore, it has to be remarked that some 
regional governments are controlled by political coalitions 
led by the Communist Party, of which private business is 
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rather wary and whose legitimacy it is not too anxious to 
uphold. 
 What have been the relationships between regional 
governments and organized business interests? 
 First of all, they have varied in the different regions 
and economic sectors. 
 As to the artisan sector, for the reasons briefly 
suggested above, relationships have been intense and 
cooperative virtually everywhere.  As stipulated by state 
laws, artisan associations, proportionally to their 
membership, have been incorporated into public policy-making.  
This has given rise to a sort of corporatized pluralism: 
interest associations retain their organizational autonomy, do 
not enjoy any monopoly of representation and compete with each 
other; at the same time they institutionally take part in 
policy-making, enjoy a remarkable degree of self-government, 
and are recognized as official spokesmen of the entire sector 
(although they represent only about fifty per cent of artisan 
firms) (Massera, 1983).  Furthermore, artisans are an 
important constituency for the regional political class.  
Regional governments - of whatever political orientation - 
through their favourable policies have been actively trying to 
capture the consensus of this section of the independent 
middle classes (12).  In this way they have contributed, 
together with national legislation and policies, to the 
survival - and indeed to the consolidation - of this 
traditional sector of the economy (13). 
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 Besides these common trends, the relationships between 
artisan associations and regional governments have been to a 
large extent patterned by what La Palombara (1964) called 
parentela, an elective affinity between interest groups and 
parties based on a shared ideology and political orientation.  
Especially in the regions characterized by well-established 
political subcultures (such as "white" Veneto or "red" Emilia-
Romagna), there has been a privileged relationship between 
regional government and institutions, and the artisan 
associations sharing the same subcultural roots.  These 
privileged relationships obviously draw on the well-
established links between political parties and interest 
groups, which were suggested at the beginning.  This 
partnership is mutually advantageous: the regional political 
class consolidates its legitimacy and consensus; the 
association strengthens its dominant position in the sectoral 
system of interest representation.  On the whole, and this is 
what matters most, the two actors contribute to the stability 
of the local political system. 
 A similar pattern can be detected in the relationships 
between regional governments and associations representing 
cooperatives.  Although the latter do not enjoy an 
institutional role in the policy-making process, they are one 
of three interest groups regional governments pay a great deal 
of attention to, particularly in the regions where 
cooperatives are an important element of the local economy 
(Italy's centre-north-east).  As in the case of artisan 
 15 
associations, the relationships between regions and interest 
groups are of the parentela type and deeply affected by the 
different political subcultures. 
 The picture changes considerably when we turn to 
industry.  The relationships between regional governments and 
industrial interest associations range from good to non-
existent, displaying wide regional variations.  A number of 
ecological factors have been put forward as possible 
independent variables to explain such variations.  It has been 
suggested (14) that the differences in the patterns of 
interaction between the two actors can be explained by the 
socio-economic structures of the regions.  This explanation is 
based on the well-known model of the "three Italies" 
(Bagnasco, 1977).  According to this interpretation, in the 
first area (Italy's north-west), characterized by an 
industrial structure made up of large-sized, technologically 
advanced firms and of a network of small- and medium-sized 
firms linked to the former, relationships are good and well-
established, based on consultation and cooperation.  Business 
associations are recognized as legitimate and crucial interest 
groups; they play an active role in the formation of regional 
industrial policies.  In the second area (Italy's centre-
north-east), where small- and medium-sized firms producing 
mainly consumer goods predominate, relationships are, on the 
whole, less cooperative and sometimes conflictual.  The 
associations representing private capital are not as strong 
and influential as in the northwestern area and face the 
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aggressive competition of powerful associations representing 
cooperative and artisan firms (to which regional governments 
tend to give privileged status and access).  Private industry 
does not play any special role in the process of industrial 
policy-making.  In the third area (Italy's south), which is 
only partially industrialized and is split between a few giant 
(state-owned) firms and a plethora of micro-firms, 
relationships are virtually non-existent.  Interaction between 
business interest associations and regional institutions is 
episodic, not institutionalized, and has an ad hoc character.  
Informal and clientelistic contacts based on personal 
relationships and influence largely replace organized 
political representation (15). 
 But the socio-economic context is not sufficient as a 
variable to explain the different patterns of relationship 
between regional institutions and organized industrial 
interests; above all, it is not able to explain variations 
within the same area.  Political variables can help to make 
sense of some of the differences, which can be observed.  For 
example, in Italy's second area the kind of political 
coalitions controlling regional governments tends to affect 
the relationships with private business.  In general terms, 
regional governments controlled by Christian Democracy tend to 
have better and more cooperative relationships with the 
interest associations representing private industry than 
regional governments controlled by the Communist Party do.  
This depends as much on the different attitudes and behaviour 
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of regional governments toward private capital as on the 
different perception and posture of organized business.  In 
Communist-dominated Emilia-Romagna, for example, the regional 
federation of Confindustria has taken a rather negative and 
defensive attitude toward the region's policies in the 
industrial field, in practice advocating as little 
intervention as possible without putting forward alternative 
proposals.  On its part, the regional government is keeping 
private business under pressure by promoting the development 
of cooperatives and by favouring the interest groups closest 
to it. 
 In addition to these ecological factors some weight must 
be given also to endogenous factors, i.e. those internal to 
the interest organizations themselves.  Given the ill-defined 
status and the limited resources they enjoy, regional 
federations prove to be most effective and influential if 
among their members there is a dominant provincial 
association.  This is the case in both Piedmont and Lombardy 
(north-west), whose regional federations are generally rated 
as the strongest and most effective in dealing with regional 
governments.  In both regions there is a provincial business 
association, which is clearly dominant and therefore able to 
exercise hierarchical control over the other provincial 
associations (they are by far the two most important 
territorial associations affiliated to Confindustria).  Since 
these territorial associations dominate the internal life of 
the respective regional federation, and hence can influence in 
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large measure their behaviour, the latter do not become 
autonomous organizations competing with the former for the 
political representation of regional business interests.  In 
other words, regional federations become an extension of the 
dominant provincial associations, increasing their power and 
making them even more representative vis-a-vis regional 
institutions.  As long as the regional federations go on 
depending on a single dominant provincial association for 
their resources and legitimacy, the potential conflicts 
between the two organizations are kept to a minimum and the 
regional federations' representativeness and effectiveness are 
consequently enhanced. 
 
Organized Business Interests and Regional Industrial Policies 
 
  The prerogatives of the regions in the field of 
industrial policies are set out in and delimited by the 1948 
Constitution.  According to article 117 of the Constitution, 
regional governments were to be granted powers in such diverse 
areas as health, housing, urban planning, agriculture, 
vocational training, museums and libraries, tourism, spas, etc.  
In the industrial field the law-making powers of ordinary 
regions were kept to a minimum (Massera, 1983).  In fact, 
article 117 does not mention at all industry among the areas in 
which the regions can exercise their powers. This apparent 
limit, however, has been overcome in several ways.  First, the 
Constitution expressly mentions the artisan sector 
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(artigianato)  among the areas of regional intervention.  This 
is crucial.  Since most firms are very small in size (let us 
say, ten employees), by extension artigianato can in fact cover 
a substantial section of the regional industrial structure 
(16).  Second, the regions’ powers cover issues such as 
territorial and urban planning, vocational training, and public 
works, which are indirectly of great relevance for industry.  
Third, regions have tended to bypass constitutional limitations 
by setting up independent bodies and companies (often in 
partnership with private actors) to carry out interventions 
formally outside their jurisdiction. 
 After an initial period (1970-72), during which regions 
wrote their statutes and got organized, in the last decade 
most regional governments have used their powers and resources 
to do something in the industrial field.  The main types of 
regional intervention have been: improvement of industrial 
locations, provision of infrastructure, establishment of 
regional financial companies, drawing up of plans for 
industrial restructuration, and, above all, provision of 
financial support (subsidies, grants, cheap loans, etc.) to 
small-sized firms (17). 
 Broadly speaking, regional policies in the industrial 
field have not been particularly impressive in terms of far-
sightedness and effectiveness (Lassini, 1979, 1980).  In the 
main, with only few exceptions, such policies have been 
piecemeal, uncoordinated, and short-term.  They have had a 
marked ad hoc and particularistic character, above all as 
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adaptive responses to local crises and requests of support.  
Basically, policies have been distributive, in the form of 
financial contributions and incentives of various kinds (18).  
Instead of anticipating events with a strategic approach, 
regional governments have in large measure resorted to 
incrementalism. This kind of policies has contributed to a 
very limited extent to improve the regional industrial system, 
to bring about the adjustments necessary for the firms to meet 
successfully the new economic challenges, or to respond to the 
need of a changing industrial environment (19). 
 In assessing the performance of regions in the field of 
industrial policies it is fair to keep in mind the limitations 
and constraints under which regional institutions operate. 
There is no doubt that the powers and resources granted to the 
ordinary regions in this specific policy area are, on the 
whole, scanty and fragmentary. It is true as well that a 
national frame of reference for local industrial policies is 
lacking, which makes any planning at the regional level a 
difficult exercise.  These are the usual complaints made 
apologetically by regional policy-makers.  But other factors 
help to explain why regional industrial policies turned out to 
be of the sort I suggested. Here I want to call attention to 
the articulation of business interests and to their 
relationships with political parties, drawing on what I have 
said in the preceding sections of the paper. 
 We have seen that the representation of business 
interests is fragmented along a number of cleavages (size, 
 21 
legal status of the firms, political allegiance).  The 
different interest groups arising out of these cleavages have 
different organizational structures, pursue different 
strategies, and to do so they exploit different resources. 
 The associations representing artisan and cooperative 
firms rely in the different political contexts mainly upon 
their privileged channels of access to and influence on 
decision-makers of the same political "family".  As 
representative, especially as far as artisans are concerned, 
of small-sized and relatively weak business interests they 
tend to concentrate on demands for financial support and 
protective measures.  In this way they establish clientelistic 
relationships with the political parties controlling regional 
governments.  On the other hand, the associations representing 
industrial firms are less interested in the kind of 
distributive and short-term measures sought after by artisan 
and cooperative firms.  At the same time the territorial 
associations, with the exceptions of Piedmont and Lombardy, do 
not have the ability to aggregate the interests of their 
members and transform them into demands to feed into the 
policy-making process.  The result is that, in many cases, 
regional associations are content with interventions of 
limited scope. 
 In sum, the configuration of business interests and the 
modes of their political representation are conducive to 
distributive and particularistic policies, often based upon 
clientelistic relationships between political parties and 
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interest groups.  This hypothesis seems corroborated e 
contrario by the cases of Piedmont and Lombardy, the two 
regions that, relatively speaking, have attempted a more 
consistent and strategic approach to industrial problems: here 
the representation of business interests is less fragmented, 
inter-organizational competition is affected to a lesser degree 
by privileged relationships with parties in government, and one 
dominant industrial association has been able to exercise an 
effective leadership in this policy area.  In this context, 
therefore, the relationships between regional governments and 
industrial associations are more institutionalized and stable, 
the making of industrial policies is based more on collective 
political negotiation than on diffuse group pressures or 
personal influence. 
 If the characteristics of interest representation affect 
policies, in its turn the distributive and fragmentary 
character of regional policies does not provide any incentive 
to the aggregation and redefinition of business interests, to 
the emergence of different modes of their political 
representation.  In this way policies and interest 
organization reinforce each other in a vicious circle.  It is 
unlikely that this state of affairs will change in the 
foreseeable future.  These patterns of policy-making and 
interest articulation are too entrenched in the character of 
the political system, both at the local and national level, 
and in the structure of the industrial system.  The substance 
of regional industrial policies is likely to remain the same, 
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unless some deep change takes place.  In the second half of 
the 1970s trade unions appeared to be willing to push for a 
change in policies and policy-making at the regional level.  
But they did not succeed and ended up being trapped in the 
established patterns, unable to do anything about it (20). 
 On the whole, at the regional level there are no 
institutionalized procedures for industrial policy-making, 
which provide for the participation of organized business 
interests (or, for that matter, trade unions).  The influence 
which business interests bring to bear on regional governments 
is still very much based on pressure, collective and 
individual, formal and informal.  This dominant pattern of 
pressure politics is accompanied by the clientele 
relationships, which link interest groups with political 
parties.  Beyond the smokescreen of ritualistic consultations 
and joint meetings between policy-makers and interest groups, 
policies are fundamentally the result of these fragmented and 
conflicting lobbying activities.  Political parties - and 
party factions - still play a crucial role in the policy-
making process (21) and do not appear willing to give up any 
of their prerogatives for the benefit of organized interests 
and institutionalized participation. 
 To conclude, both the representation of interests and the 
policy-making process retain a fundamentally pluralist 
character.  In this respect, I do not see any clear trends 
toward forms of local corporatism (with the partial exception 
of the artisan sector) or, even less, established corporatist 
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patterns. These brief and tentative remarks upon the 
interaction between organized business interests and regional 
governments lead me to question whether some form of 
corporatism is possible at all in Italy. 
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Table 1 
 
Territorial and sectoral business organizations in Italy, 1980 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------
-   National        Provincial         Regional         
Sectoral 
association     organizations     organizations    
organizations 
--------------------------------------------------------------
-- AGCI                  76                17                7      
CASA                  54                16               17      
CCI                   98                20               14      
CGIA                 107                20               27      
CGII                 106                20               98      
CPMI                  54                 8                9      
CNA                   97                18                6      
LNCM                  98                20               10 
--------------------------------------------------------------
-- Total                690               139              188 
--------------------------------------------------------------
--  
AGCI: Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane 
CASA: Confederazione Autonoma Sindacati Artigiani 
CCI : Confederazione Cooperative Italiane 
CGIA: Confederazione Generale Italiana dell'Artigianato 
CGII: Confederazione Generale Italiana dell'Industria 
CPMI: Confederazione della Piccola e Media Industria 
CNA : Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato 
LNCM: Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue 
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Notes 
 
 
 
1) The paper grows out and tries to combine the results of 
my participation in two research projects.  On the one hand, 
the comparative research on The Organization of Business 
Interests directed by P.C.Schmitter and W.Streeck.  On the 
other hand, a research project sponsored by the Istituto per 
la Scienza dell'Amministrazione Pubblica (ISAP) of Milan and 
directed by G.  Romagnoli, on the interaction between regional 
governments and unions in the formation process of industrial 
policies  
 
2) In the paper I do not take into consideration the two 
employers' associations - ASAP and INTERSIND - which represent 
state-owned firms    
 
3) For a detailed exposition of this terminology see 
Schmitter and Streeck (1981) 
 
4) See the excellent Istituto Cattaneo (1968). On PCI's 
strategy toward middle classes see Hellman (1976)  
 
5) See Istituto Cattaneo, op.cit.  The LNC was established 
in 1886 as a national association organizing and representing 
the interests of cooperatives.  The largely Socialist-
dominated LNC enjoyed a monopolistic position in the 
representation of cooperatives until the First World War.  In 
the 1919 Catholic forces established the CCI as a competitive 
organization.  The third association was established in 1952 
when Republicans and Social democrats left the LNC and formed 
the AGCI 
 
6) This is best exemplified by the LNC.  See Zan (1982), Ch. 
8 
 
7) Local organizations usually cover an area corresponding 
to the administrative unit called  'province'  (provincia), 
although sometimes - in the country's most industrialized 
areas - they cover a smaller territory 
 
8) This has been a general trend for business interest 
associations, but, understandably, it has been more marked for 
the associations organizing small-sized and artisan firms 
 
9) See the data and remarks in Lassini (1984) 
 
10) In particular, the associations representing cooperatives 
seem to have given a high priority to the establishment of 
regional organizations 
 
11) For example, they control 80 per cent of the votes of 
Confindustria General Assembly (quoted by Berrini (1983): 228) 
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12) See Pizzorno (1974) 
 
13) On the survival of traditional middle classes in Italy 
see the remarks in Berger (1974). For an analysis of state and 
regional policies in the artisan sector see Falcon (1979) 
 
14) The suggestion comes from Luca Lanzalaco, who is 
currently working on his doctoral dissertation at the European 
University Institute in Florence about "Regional Devolution 
and Local Corporatism in Italy"   
 
15) See the results of a research carried out in the Catania 
area  (Eastern Sicily) in Catanzaro (1979) 
 
16) This differs according to the specific industrial 
structure, both in terms of sectoral specialization and 
employment, of each region.  See Fondazione Agnelli (1974) 
 
17) A good summary of regional industrial policies can be 
found in Lassini (1979) 
 
18) For a definition of distributive policies, and their 
implications for the political system, see Lowi (1972) 
 
19) This picture probably describes more accurately the 
situation in the regions in the centre-north-eastern area of 
the country.  For Veneto see Bagnasco and Trigilia (1984); for 
Emilia-Romagna I draw on my own research 
 
20) Cf. Bagnasco and Trigilia, op.cit., on how things went in 
Veneto 
 
21) Interest groups often complain that they get consulted 
after decisions have been already taken 
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